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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Valencia asserted that the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because he alleged facts that showed
his attorneys were ineffective when they misinformed him about the consequences of pleading
guilty. He argued the record did not show that he was ever told, prior to pleading guilty, that the
State would not ultimately dismiss the original charge, which he wanted to take to trial, and file a
new charge if he did not plead guilty.
In response, the State argues that defense counsel’s comments at the change of plea
hearing—regarding his conversations with the prosecutor—made it clear to Mr. Valencia that the
State would not file the new charge if he did not plead guilty. Additionally, the State argues that
even if defense counsel’s performance was deficient, Mr. Valencia did not show that this
deficiency prejudiced him because he pled guilty for other reasons. This reply brief is necessary
to address those arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Valencia’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Valencia’s post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Valencia’s Post-Conviction Petition
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Valencia argued the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his post-conviction petition because he alleged facts to support his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and his comments, as well as his counsel’s comments, at both the relevant
hearings showed he was under the impression that the State would dismiss the charge he wanted
to take to trial—battery with intent to commit rape—and file a new charge of forcible penetration
with a foreign object if he did not plead guilty. (App. Br., pp.10-19.) In response, the State
argues that even if Mr. Valencia believed the State was going to charge him with the new charge
if he did not plead guilty, that belief was “undone by defense counsel’s comments” at the change
of plea hearing. (Resp. Br., p.9.)
The State takes issue with the following statement in the appellant’s brief: “the issue is
whether Mr. Valencia was told by his attorneys that the State was not going to bring the charge
at the time he pleaded guilty.” (Resp. Br., p.8, n.3.) The State argues, “The district court’s
decision was based on Valencia’s affirmative claim that he ‘pled guilty because the State
threatened to charge him under the forcible penetration statute – not that his trial counsel failed
to tell him that the State ‘was not going to bring that charge.’” (Resp. Br., p.8 n.3 (citations
omitted).) The State, however, then argues that defense counsel’s comments at the change of
plea hearing made it clear to Mr. Valencia that the prosecutor was not going to bring the new
charge. (Resp. Br., pp.8-13.) Thus, the State implicitly agrees that Mr. Valencia’s knowledge
and understanding of whether the State could or would file the new charge is crucial to the
resolution of this case, and goes to the issue of whether Mr. Valencia pled guilty because he
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believed, based on his counsel’s erroneous advice, that the State would bring the new charge and
could get a conviction on that charge.
A post-conviction petition cannot be summarily dismissed unless the allegations are
“clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings,” or “do not justify relief as a matter
of law.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523 (2007) (emphasis added). The record in this
case does not clearly disprove Mr. Valencia’s allegations because it does not clearly show that
Mr. Valencia understood that, if he did not plead guilty, the state could not and would not
dismiss the charge he wanted to take to trial and file the new charge. First, when Mr. Valencia
went to the sentencing hearing almost two weeks after the change of plea hearing, he still
believed the State could have and would have dismissed the original charge and filed the new
charge if he had not pled guilty. At the beginning of that hearing, Mr. Valencia stated that his
attorney told him the day before he pled guilty, that the prosecutor had threatened to “dismiss
this battery with intent and file another charge that they could potentially find me guilty of . . . .”
(Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 1:10 – 1:35.) He went on to say, “Since
the court already knows that I was pretty adamant to going to trial on the battery with intent . . .
for her to give that option and try to dismiss it and file something else that they can potentially
find me guilty on, to me, that’s vindictive prosecution.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of
12/15/15 hearing at 1:40 – 2:00) These statements make it clear that Mr. Valencia did not
understand—based on defense counsel’s comments at the change of plea hearing, or to
Mr. Valencia directly—that the State would not bring the new charge if he chose not to plead
guilty.
Indeed, the first time the prosecutor directly addressed this issue was at the sentencing
hearing after Mr. Valencia made the above statements. She stated that she had conversations
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with defense counsel about the issue and told him she “did not believe [she] could charge that”
based on the law at the time the alleged crime was committed.1 (Supp. Record: Audio Recording
of 12/15/15 hearing at 4:30 – 5:10) There is no clear indication that defense counsel ever told
Mr. Valencia about those conversations with the prosecutor before he pled guilty. Rather, as
addressed below, defense counsel indicated that Mr. Valencia pled guilty due in part to the threat
that he perceived because of counsel’s previous comments to him about the State being able to
secure a conviction on the new charge.
Second, Mr. Valencia’s continuing belief that the prosecutor would dismiss the original
charge and file the new charge is understandable. Contrary to the State’s argument on appeal,
defense counsel’s comments on the issue before the district court—particularly to a person who
is not an attorney—were not clear. Moreover, his comments indicated that Mr. Valencia was
“availing himself” of the plea agreement at least in part because of the State’s threat. Defense
counsel stated,
I wanted to put on the record . . . that the basis for why my client is availing
himself of this agreement, it’s for several issues . . . . Obviously, the potential
consequences of being found guilty and . . . what could potentially happen if he is
found guilty . . . with regards to all the cases the State has indicated several times
as well on the record that they intended on filing a persistent violator . . . .
Additionally, I had conversations with [the prosecutor] . . . about the State’s
potentially, and that there was apparently at some point . . . there was about
dismissing and filing of a different charge . . . . I think that also played a role in
that, but we did have conversations with regards to that, and I just wanted to put
that on the record.

1

The prosecutor went on to say, “The grounds that the defendant is raising with regards to his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea were all covered in great depth” with the district court . . . .”
(Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/15/15 hearing at 6:45 – 7:00.) However, the prosecutor
never said, at the change of plea hearing, that she did not believe she could charge Mr. Valencia
with forcible penetration with a foreign object based on the statute as it existed at the time the
alleged crime was committed. Rather, whether a persistent violator enhancement could apply if
Mr. Valencia did not plead guilty was covered in great depth. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording
of 12/3/15 hearing at 7:30 – 19:30.)
5

(Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 7:30 - 8:27 (emphasis added).) He then
said, “And I’m not saying that the State was going to . . . we just had conversations about them
having the ability to do so.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 8:27 – 8:30.)
The State relies on this last statement to argue, “Regardless of what Valencia may have
believed up to that point, the record shows he was informed by his counsel’s comments prior to
his guilty plea that the prosecutor did not threaten that she ‘would file’” the new charge if he did
not plead guilty. (Resp. Br., p.10 (emphasis in original).) However, that statement does not
clearly disprove Mr. Valencia’s allegations. For one thing, it is not clear to whom the pronoun
“we” refers in defense counsel’s statement that ends with “we just had conversations about them
having the ability to do so.” It could refer to him and Mr. Valencia or it could refer to him and
the prosecutor. Also, when defense counsel said, “I’m not saying that the State was going to . . .
.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 8:27 – 8:30 (emphasis added)),
Mr. Valencia—particularly in light of defense counsel’s use of the past tense—could have
thought that the prosecutor still could dismiss and file the new charge if he did not ultimately
plead guilty.

Thus, defense counsel’s statement did not magically clear up the issue for

Mr. Valencia, or for this case. What would have made the issue clear is if defense counsel stated
something to the effect of, “After my conversations with my client about the prosecutor
potentially dismissing and refiling a new charge I spoke with the prosecutor again, and she has
assured me that she has no intention of doing so. I have told Mr. Valencia about this.” If the
district court then confirmed that statement with the prosecutor, and confirmed that Mr. Valencia
understood it, his allegations would be clearly disproven. However, nothing like that occurred.
Instead, defense counsel stated to the district court that the conversations he had with the
prosecutor about her dismissing and filing a new charge “played a role” in Mr. Valencia’s
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decision to plead guilty. (Supp. Record: Audio Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 8:10 - 8:25.)
This supports Mr. Valencia’s argument that defense counsel came to him and said if he did not
plead guilty, the State would follow through on its threat. Thus, the record does not clearly show
that Mr. Valencia “was informed by his counsel’s comments prior to his guilty plea that the
prosecutor did not threaten that she would ‘would file’” the new charge if Mr. Valencia did not
plead guilty. (Resp. Br., p.10 (emphasis in original).)
Third, the audio recording of the change of plea hearing demonstrates that these
discussions in front of the district court were happening quickly. For a layperson in a stressful
situation such as this, such discussions may be highly confusing. For example, even after
defense counsel spoke with him directly about it, Mr. Valencia was still having trouble
understanding whether a persistent violator enhancement could apply if he chose not to plead
guilty that day; he said twice that he did not understand the issue.2 (Supp. Record: Audio
Recording of 12/3/15 hearing at 15:30 – 19:30.)
Finally, Mr. Valencia’s statements at the change of plea hearing also show his belief that
the prosecutor could dismiss the original charge and refile a new charge was not “undone” by
defense counsel’s comments at the beginning of the hearing. (Resp. Br., p.9.) When the district
court asked why Mr. Valencia wrote that he could not make a reasoned and informed decision
because of duress (Supp. Record Exhibits, p.111), he replied, “just the short amount of time, and

2

Additionally, even though the State had the ability to listen to the sentencing hearing audio
multiple times, its statements on appeal indicate that it was not clear what the prosecutor was
talking about when she spoke about this issue at the sentencing hearing. The State argues, “The
prosecutor’s comments about her conversations with defense counsel centered on two separate
‘incidents’ and issues, most likely those discussed at the entry of plea hearing . . . .” (Resp.
Br., p.11 (emphasis added).) Similarly, the State argues, “The prosecutor’s comments show that
those comments pertain to an entirely different issue – most likely the ‘persistent violator’ issue
she discussed at the plea entry hearing.” (Resp. Br., p.12 n.7 (emphasis added).)
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just the notification that I was aware that if I was to proceed today, I would be subject to the
persistent violator if found guilty. I’m aware of that, as well as the potential dismissal of the
case on the battery issue and then refiled as a different issue.” (Supp. Record: Audio Recording
of 12/3/15 hearing at 40:05 – 40:50 (emphasis added).) As such, the record shows that he did
believe—based on defense counsel’s erroneous advice as to the application of the statute—that
the threat existed when he pleaded guilty, and defense counsel’s statements at the change of plea
hearing did not prove otherwise. Indeed, at the end of the change of plea hearing, when the
district court asked defense counsel if it had “adequately summed up” the reasons Mr. Valencia
pled guilty, counsel stated, “Judge, I think we’ve put on the record several times, there’s lots of
reasons why my client is entering this plea, it’s just to avoid consequences of conviction, initial
charges, different charges, it’s a culmination of everything.”

(Supp. Record: Audio Recording

of 12/3/15 hearing at 55:50 – 56:15.)
Relying on that final colloquy at the change of plea hearing, the State also argues that
“regardless of whether his attorney’s performance was deficient, Valencia failed to demonstrate
that such performance prejudiced him . . . .” (Resp. Br., p.18.) A defendant can demonstrate
prejudice if he shows “‘a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would be different but
for counsel’s deficient performance.’” Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011) (quoting
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id. The “relevant inquiry” is whether, but for

counsel’s errors, the defendant “would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Id. at 622. The State argues that the record shows Mr. Valencia pled guilty to “‘take
advantage of the plea agreement to avoid the persistent violator enhancement and registering as a
sex offender’ and ‘agreed that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily and was not under
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duress.’” (Resp. Br., p.18 (quoting district court’s Order Dismissing Petition).) However, as the
foregoing statements show that Mr. Valencia still believed the State could and would dismiss the
original charge and file the new charge, he would think he was entering his plea knowingly and
voluntarily.

(See App. Br., p.15.) Further, the district court never asked whether he was

pleading guilty due in part to his concern that the State could bring the new charge if he chose
not to plead guilty. As discussed above, this is the concern he voiced during the change of plea
hearing.
Given Mr. Valencia’s concern about this, the nature and content of defense counsel’s
statements on the issue at the change of plea hearing, and Mr. Valencia’s confusion regarding
whether the persistent violator enhancement could apply if he did not plead guilty, there was a
reasonable probability that he pled guilty due, at least in part, to counsel’s failure to inform him
he could not be convicted under the statute as it existed as the time the alleged crime was
committed. Therefore, the record did not clearly disprove Mr. Valencia’s allegations; it did not
clearly disprove that he pled guilty based on the erroneous advice of counsel. Rather the
hearings demonstrate there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Valencia
understood that the State could not and would not ultimately bring the new charge if he did not
plead guilty. As such, an evidentiary hearing was necessary, and the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed the petition.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Valencia respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s judgment
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand the case for an evidentiary
hearing.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2019.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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Administrative Assistant
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